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Abstract 
This work provides a parametric and semi-parametric analysis of the relationship between the 
proportionality degree of an electoral system and corruption. This allows us to properly consider 
mixed electoral systems alongside the two traditional ones, proportional and plurality. Results show 
that a reduction in the proportionality degree within the same proportional system is not beneficial 
in fighting corruption because it weakens the monitoring power of opponents (their 
representativeness reduces) without the introduction of the voters’ monitoring. On the contrary, 
mixed rules allow both monitors to exercise their power to induce politicians to avoid corrupt 
behaviour. Increasing plurality elements into mixed systems is beneficial only up to certain 
proportionality degrees, after which the corresponding level of corruption begins to grow. 
Therefore, for governors who want to adopt mixed electoral systems, the choice of their 
proportionality degree becomes fundamental. 
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1. Introduction 
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon that is difficult to capture in a single definition. The World 
Bank‘s definition of corruption – political and bureaucratic – is the “abuse of public power for 
private benefit”. It is generally found in the public sector involving government officials. 
Corruption is identified as “the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development”.1 This 
is the reason why a growing number of theoretical and empirical papers in economic, social and 
political literature have studied the causes of corruption. This work advances empirical studies on 
the political determinants of corruption;2 in particular, it analyses how electoral systems affect 
corruption.  
The role of electoral systems as a way of reducing corruption was first emphasized by Schumpeter 
(1950). In the following years, theoretical literature studying the link between electoral systems and 
corruption increased, often with ambiguous conclusions (Persson and Tabellini,1999, 2000, 2002; 
Myerson, 1993). Although empirical studies have confirmed that countries with proportional 
systems have much more widespread corruption than countries with majoritarian representations, 
the empirical question on the effects of the electoral system on corruption remains open for three 
reasons: 1) the difficulties in measuring corruption; 2) the effect of the electoral system on 
corruption appears fragile because the results are not robust to the inclusion of control variables or 
the use of data from different years (Treisman, 2007); 3) there have been no comprehensive studies 
on the effect of mixed systems on corruption so far, despite the trend of countries to change their 
extreme electoral positions towards mixed ones. Our analysis focuses on this third point.  
Recently, political scientists have underlined that new electoral systems could be designed in order 
to maximize both the objective that defines the trade-off between representation, and the 
accountability of political parties which characterise the two “extreme” electoral rules, majoritarian 
and proportional. In this light, mixed systems, combining proportional representation (PR) and 
majoritarian elements, are becoming one the most attractive electoral rules nowadays. Therefore, it 
is important to understand the consequences that such a shift has on corruption. 
Analysing mixed systems in an empirical framework is not easy. Previous works (Kunicova and 
Rose Ackerman, 2005) have studied those systems using a dummy variable, but this practice is 
misleading because some of them have a larger proportional element than others; that is, they may 
be designed with different degrees of proportionality. Therefore, in order to consider mixed systems 
properly, a continuous measure of the degree of proportionality of an electoral rule is needed. The 
use of the Gallagher disproportionality index as a measure of the proportionality degree of an 
                                                            
1The World Bank. 
2Here, we are referring to political corruption; it is defined as the misuse of public office for private financial gain by an 
elected official (Treisman, 2000). 
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electoral rule is the first contribution that the present work gives to the empirical literature analysing 
how electoral systems affect corruption. Our hypothesis is that the effect of electoral rules on 
corruption greatly depend on the characteristics of responsiveness and accountability that PR and 
plurality representations have, respectively. These characteristics define the level of the monitoring 
power of opponents and voters over politicians, that shape their incentive to adopt corrupt 
behaviour. Therefore, the monitoring power of minorities and voters is the key to the interpretation 
of the correlation between the proportionality degree of an electoral system and corruption. Mixed 
electoral systems, combining PR and plurality elements, allow both voters and minorities in 
parliament to monitor politicians. This double monitoring effect is surely beneficial for the 
reduction of corruption. In terms of the relationship between the proportionality degree of electoral 
rules and corruption, we expect that mixed systems are correlated to less corruption, due to their 
having an intermediate level of proportionality rather than the extreme ones. This mathematically 
translates in a nonlinear curve with corruption assuming its minimum value within the range of 
proportionality. 
The second contribution that this paper offers focuses on empirical methodology. Indeed, we 
conducted a cross-country analysis over 75 countries from 1984 to 2010 using both parametric and 
semi-parametric panel data techniques. The latter are, in general, very recent and they have never 
been employed in this field of literature. The results confirm that mixed systems work better than 
extreme systems only if they are designed with a certain proportionality degree. Graphically, we 
find that the relationship between the proportionality degree of electoral rules and the efficiency of 
government and business (which summarises our measure of corruption) is a sine curve function; 
this functional form appears very new and offers an interesting interpretation. Shifting from more to 
less proportional PR systems, corruption increases because the lower monitoring power of 
minorities is not substituted by the voters’ monitoring. Instead, moving to mixed systems with a 
high proportionality degree and slightly reducing it, the monitoring power of opponents (ensured by 
PR elements) is flanked by the increasing monitoring power of voters (ensured by plurality 
elements), giving an incentive to politicians to avoid corruption. The consequence is that corruption 
decreases. On the contrary, mixed systems with high plurality characteristics and little PR features 
maintain a high accountability of incumbent politicians to voters, so the monitoring of minorities 
weakens, thus providing fertile ground for corrupt behaviour: corruption starts increasing again. The 
policy implications of such a result are straightforward: although mixed systems are better than 
extreme rules in fighting corruption, only certain proportionality degrees characterising mixed rules 
assure that corruption is minimised. 
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The remainder of this article is organised as follows. The next section summarises the theoretical 
and empirical literature on the link between electoral systems and corruption, and clarifies the 
theoretical framework for the empirical analysis. Then we present a description of data and 
variables. In section 4 we discuss both the parametric and semi-parametric specifications of the 
empirical model and the results, followed by the conclusion. 
 
2. The literature and the theoretical framework 
The principal agent theory defines the relationship between electoral rules and corrupt behaviour of 
politicians and bureaucrats (Kunikova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Persson et al., 2003): they are the 
agent and voters are the principal. Because of the asymmetry of information in the principal-agent 
relationship, politicians and bureaucrats have opportunities to extract rents. In particular, politicians 
face a trade-off between rent-seeking and appearing incorrupt and honest to their voters in order to 
increase the probability of re-election. The incentive to extract rent by politicians is affected by the 
characteristics of electoral rules.  
For legislative bodies, electoral rules define how votes are converted into sets of legislators. 
Therefore,  they  permit citizens to select their own representatives. The basic distinction is between 
proportional systems (PR) and plurality/majoritarian systems. In PR systems legislative seats are 
allocated to political parties on the basis of the total votes won by each party. More precisely, in an 
open list PR system, voters may express preferences over particular candidates within a party, while 
in a closed list PR system, party leaders determine the order in which individual politicians are 
ranked on the party list. Once the total number of seats awarded to a party is determined, that 
number of politicians from the top of the list are elected. By contrast, in majoritarian systems, the 
candidate or party with the greatest number of votes wins all the seats in a district. 
There is a general consensus among scholars that an ideal electoral system cannot be designed. 
Although many scholars harbour strong preferences for one type of system rather than another, it is 
widely argued that “the choice between majoritarian and proportional elections is a trade-off 
between accountability and responsiveness” (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Majoritarian elections 
have the twin virtues of strength and accountability of the party government. “Strength” means a 
single-party (not coalition) government. Cohesive parties with a majority of parliamentary seats are 
able to implement their manifesto policies without the need to engage in post-election negotiations 
with coalition partners. At the end of their tenure in office, governments remain accountable to the 
electorate, who can remove them if they wish to, but the government is not always responsive to 
change in popular opinion. Proportional elections grant accurate representation of voters’ desires, 
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but without the assurance of a clear cut majority,  governments are less accountable for their 
decisions.  
In the light of such characteristics, theoretical literature has studied the link between electoral 
systems and corruption according to the district size and the electoral formula. If the district size 
(i.e. the number of seats in a district) is considered, in majoritarian systems characterised by small 
districts with only one candidate in each, the incumbent, already well known in the constituency, is 
more likely to reach a relative majority. However, in a proportional system, large districts that 
appoint several candidates are more likely to push aside new candidates who got a minority of 
votes. Myerson (1993) and Ferejohn (1986) showed that small districts increase the barriers to 
entry. Therefore, with respect to majoritarian electoral systems, proportional electoral systems with 
a large district magnitude tend to have smaller barriers to entry, which is associated with stiffer 
competition, leading to smaller incumbent rent. Referring to the electoral formula (i.e. how votes 
are translated into seats), when voters vote for an individual candidate, there is a direct link between 
individual performance and individual reappointment because voters base the valuation of their 
representatives on their ability to represent interests of the community. Thus the incumbent faces 
strong incentives to perform well in order to maximise the probability of re-election. However, 
when voters vote for a list the chances of re-election depend on the candidate’s rank in the list, and 
so each candidate has a weaker incentive to perform well. Therefore, according to that dimension of 
the analysis, in a proportional system the incentive for corruption is higher than in a majoritarian 
system (Persson and Tabellini (1999; 2000; 2002). The empirical works of Persson, Tabellini and 
Trebbi (2003), Gagliarducci, Nannicini, Naticchioni, (2011) suggest that countries with proportional 
systems have much more widespread corruption than countries with majoritarian systems. Kunicova 
and Rose Ackerman (2005) find that closed lists PR are more corrupt than open lists PR, and both 
are more corrupt than plurality systems. Golden and Chang (2001) and Chang (2005) conclude the 
opposite: open list PR and plurality systems could lead to more corruption than closed list PR, since 
the former allow voters to favour or disfavour individual politicians. Golden and Chang (2007) 
show that the previous relationship fails to hold up once district magnitude is considered. They have 
found that once the district magnitudes exceed a certain threshold, both at cross-national and at 
national (Italian) level, open-list PR systems (which allow voters to select individual candidates 
from party lists) are associated with greater corruption than closed-list systems (where candidate 
selection is controlled by the national party leadership) . 
The common features of those empirical papers are 1) to identify PR and majoritarian systems with 
a dummy variable and 2) not to consider mixed systems at all or to consider them marginally, and 
always with a dummy variable, neglecting their proportionality degree. 
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Nowadays, mixed systems are becoming an interesting topic in political science literature because 
more and more countries are abandoning the “extreme” electoral rules in favor of mixed 
representation. A mixed electoral system uses both PR and plurality features for elections to the 
same legislative body, that is, some members are elected nominally and others from a party list. 
Kostadinova (2002) argued that mixed systems allow countries to enjoy the benefits of minority 
representation (within the Parliament) and, at the same time, they produce less fractionalisation than 
proportional systems. Mixed rules are usually adopted with the hope that the advantages of both 
“extreme” electoral designs can be enjoyed in a ‘‘best of both worlds’’ scenario (Shugart and 
Wattenberg, 2001). 
This justifies the increasing interest on the part of political and economic scientists to explore the 
effects that mixed systems have on economic and political variables. Up to now, there have not 
been any comprehensive empirical studies on the effect of mixed systems on corruption. 
Our theoretical framework in the analysis of the link between electoral systems and corruption is 
based on the characteristics of electoral rules; they shape the rent seeking incentive of politicians 
which depends on the probability of detection for corrupt behaviour. The higher accountability of 
plurality rules makes voters the monitor of politicians; the higher representativeness of PR rules 
makes opponents/minorities the monitor of politicians. We argue that mixed rules, giving the 
monitoring power to both voters and minorities, may balance the trade-off between accountability 
and responsiveness that reduces corruption. That is, mixed rules maintain the independent effects of 
responsiveness of PR and accountability of majoritarian representation, which are stronger in 
fighting corruption. But mixed electoral systems are a heterogeneous category. Virtually all of them 
employ some combinations of majoritarian and proportional representation, but there are substantial 
variations in the way in which they are combined; that is, mixed systems can be designed with 
different degrees of proportionality. Ideally one can locate the various possible mixed systems on a 
continuum from the most to the least proportional. Therefore, the correct way to consider them is to 
measure their proportionality by using a continuous measure of the proportionality degree of an 
electoral system. Political literature provides the Gallagher disproportionality index of electoral 
outcomes (see section 3). In this way, we can design a functional relationship between the latter and 
corruption. If our argument is correct, we should find a non-linear relationship between the 
proportionality degree and corruption which shows minimum levels of corruption in 
correspondence to electoral systems with an intermediate degree of proportionality. This implies 
that, in order to fight corruption, mixed representations are “better” than extreme ones, and that 
mixed systems should be designed with a proportionality degree which guarantees the presence and 
the independence of action of the two kinds of monitoring. 
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3. Data and variables 
The dependent variable of our empirical analysis is a measure of corruption. At a macroeconomic 
level, the three most popular indices based on corruption perception are the Corruption Perception 
Index (Transparency International), the Control of Corruption index (the World Bank) and the 
Corruption index (the International Country Risk Guide - ICRG).3 We choose to measure corruption 
using the Corruption index for two reasons: 1) the database of the ICRG provides , the longest time 
series of corruption data (from 1984 to 2010;4)  for about 150 countries. 2) it is highly correlated 
with the two other indices largely used in the literature, such as Transparency International Index 
and Control of Corruption index.5 
The Corruption index (thereafter Corr) is expressed on a scale reflecting the perception of 
respondents; it summarises the valuation of corruption within the political system; in particular, the 
presence of curruption is a threat to foreign investment because it “distorts the economic and 
financial environment; reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to 
assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and  introduces an inherent 
instability into the political process”.6 The result is that corruption makes it difficult to conduct 
business and, in some cases, it may force the withdrawal of investments. The Corruption index is 
based on comparable information done by assigning a risk point between the interval [0, 6] where 0 
represents the highest risk of corruption and 6 the lowest.7,8 
Figure 1 shows an overview of the corruption distribution for different countries. For each country 
in the figure we calculated the mean over years (1984-2010). To the left with a high index value 
(meaning low corruption risk) we find the Scandinavian countries and the three countries of 
Oceania (Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea). European countries in the dataset show 
low/medium level of corruption while countries in Asia, Africa and South America have the highest 
value.  
 
 
 
                                                            
3
 The indices measuring corruption can be divided into two categories. One contains indices based on corruption 
perceptions; the other  includes indices of experienced corruption. 
4
 ICRG table 3B, published by The PRS Group. 
5
 We display the autocorrelation matrix between the Corruption Index (CI), the Transparency International Index (TII) 
and Control of Corruption index (CCI), calculated over the 84 countries from 1996 to 2011 (we started from 1996 
because of the availability of the TII and CCI). 
 CI TTI CCI 
CI 1   
TII 0.8693 1  
CCI 0.8769    0.9781 1 
 
6http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_methodology.aspx 
7
 Even though the ICRG database includes a collection of records for about 150 countries, our analysis was performed 
on 75 countries. We avoided some countries because they were marginal with respect to our study. 
8Table 1 in Appendix shows the descriptive statistics of Corr. 
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Fig 1.  Mean of Corruption index over years 
 
This measure of corruption (like all corruption measures based on perception) has various 
drawbacks (Lambsdorff, 2005); a significant gap between perception and facts being the major one . 
The main regressor of the analysis is the Gallagher disproportionality (of the electoral outcome) 
index; this is especially useful for comparing proportionality across electoral systems. The 
Gallagher index (or least squares index) is a representation index of political parties within a 
Parliament; it may be considered as a very good proxy for the measure of proportionality of an 
electoral system because of the link between the kind of electoral system and the kind of political 
parties representation.. Indeed, theoretical literature states (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000) that the 
electoral system that guarantees a greater representation of political parties is a more proportional 
one while the less representative one is less proportional. Blais (1988) confirmed that it is possible 
to classify electoral systems according to their electoral outcomes. Moreover, empirical studies have 
shown that a majoritarian system produces a higher level of dis-proportionality than a proportional 
representation system (Lijphart, 1994; Anckar and Akademi, 2001), whereas a mixed-electoral 
system produces an intermediate level (Powell and Vanberg, 2000; Anckar and Akademi, 2001). 
Therefore, the Gallagher index is an excellent proxy for the degree of dis-proportionality of the 
electoral system.9 The Gallagher index (thereafter GI) is constructed as 
 = 12 (	
 − 
)
  
where vi and si are respectively the share of votes and of seats of a single political party (i=1,....,n 
political parties) at elections in each country in the time span under consideration. The index can 
take values from 0 to 100 with 0 indicating perfect proportionality between seats and votes and 100 
meaning that the only seat at stake goes to the winner. Clearly the bounds of the GI (0 and 100) are 
only theoretical values. The GI between the investigated countries ranges from 0.26 to about 33.10 
In this range fall the countries that have experienced plurality, PR and mixed systems as shown in 
                                                            
9Dis-proportionality means the deviation of the parties’ seat shares from their vote shares. Perfect proportionality is the 
situation in which each party receives exactly the same share of seats for the share of votes it receives. 
10
 See table 1 (Appendix) for the descriptive statistics of all variables. 
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table 2 (Appendix). In the time span 1980-2011, some countries maintained the same electoral 
system, while other countries changed it. For example, Italy held a PR system from 1980 to 1993 
and then a mixed one; Ukraine experienced all three systems: plurality 1994-1997, mixed 1998-
2003 and PR since 2004. The concentration of mixed systems has been particularly pronounced in 
post-communist Europe, where six states (in the database) currently employ systems of this type - 
Romania, Lithuania, Hungary, Croatia, Poland and Albania. The majority of countries adopted PR 
and then a mixed representation, with the minority using plurality rules. Not all the countries in the 
dataset had democratic elections after 1980. Table 3 (Appendix) lists countries, in decades, from 
their first democratic election; the majority of countries have had democratic elections since the 
‘80s, and only two countries since 2000.11 Finally, in table 4 (Appendix), we provide the descriptive 
statistics of GI according to the three electoral rules. It can be noticed that the mean of GI within PR 
is lower than that within the mixed system and, in its turn, is lower than that within plurality; it 
confirms that GI is a good proxy for electoral systems. But it can happen that, for the same value of 
GI, electoral systems overlap. This happens because the GI is a proper representation index.  
An important issue here is to deal with the possibility of endogeneity of the Gallagher index. All the 
theoretical literature analysing the link between electoral rules and corruption considers the first as a 
determinant of corruption and not the reverse. The endogeneity problem may arise when dealing 
with political institutions, not the electoral system (this is the reason why the variable law_order - 
that we will describe in the following paragraph  - which controls for this kind of feature - is also 
considered endogenous). In this respect, two other considerations must be made: 1) it seems 
unlikely to think that the perception of corruption (as a menace to foreign investments) may affect 
the way in which electoral systems are designed by politicians; 2) if the electoral system was 
affected by corruption, the choice of one electoral rule rather than another would be a statement of 
corruption for incumbent politicians, and they would risk dismissal from office. Therefore, we can 
rule out the endogeneity issue of the dis-proportionality index. 
The literature studying the causes of corruption names a long list of variables, claimed as 
statistically significant determinants. They can be divided into four groups: 1) economic and 
demographic, 2) political, 3) judicial and bureaucratic, 4) religious and geo-cultural (de Haan and 
Seldadyo, 2005).12 A typical empirical study limits its attention to a small number of variables of 
particular interest. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to find the “true determinants” of 
corruption: a variable found significant in a particular specification of the model, becomes 
insignificant in an alternative model, or when other variables are incorporated. In order to overcome 
                                                            
11
 it is clear that before the first year of a democratic election, GI shows missing values.  
12
 For theoretical literature on the causes of corruption see e.g. Tanzi (1998), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Jain (2001);  for 
empirical literature on the same topic see e.g. Treisman (2000). 
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this drawback, Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposed to use a Sensitivity Analysis to establish which of the 
potential determinants are robustly correlated with corruption.  
In the choice of control variables we take a cue from the findings of the Sensitivity Analysis. 
Therefore, in the empirical model, we firstly include the two typical controls in cross-country 
analysis, the (log of) per capita GDP and the population size and secondly, in order to test the 
robustness of results, we add a set of control variables believed as the most robust determinant of 
corruption. The full list of control variables is the following:13 
- Per capita GDP, in natural log (thereafter lngdp): it controls for structural differences in 
economic development (de Haan and Seldadyo, 2005). By far the strongest and most consistent 
finding of the new empirical work is that lower perceived corruption correlates closely with higher 
economic development (La Porta et al. 1999, Ades & Di Tella 1999, Treisman 2000) and it can be 
found in each region of the world (Treisman 2007),Kaufmann et al. (1999) and Hall and Jones 
(1999) question the causal relationship between corruption and income: the per capita GDP is high 
because of low corruption. For this reason we treat lngdp as endogenous.   
- Population (thereafter pop): it controls for size. Empirical literature found contrasting evidence 
(Knack and Azfar, 2003; Tavares, 2003). 
- Government stability (thereafter gov_stab): it controls for quality of government. The higher the 
quality of government, the lower the probability of corruption (de Haan and Seldadyo, 2005). 
- Democratic accountability (thereafter dem): it controls for the level of democracy of a country. 
There is a general consensus that democracy reduces corruption (de Haan and Seldadyo, 2005). 
- Law and Order (thereafter law_order): it controls for the rule of law as a measure of the 
confidence that agents have in the rules of society, the effectiveness of judiciary and the 
enforceability of contracts (de Haan and Seldadyo, 2005). A stronger rule of law reduces the 
likelihood of corruption taking place. Also in this regard, an issue of causality may emerge: 
agents may trust the rule of law because corruption is low. In order to take this problem into 
account, some estimations treat law_order as endogenous. 
- Women (thereafter wom): it is the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments 
(%); it controls for the gender dimension of corruption. Conventional wisdom states that women 
in public life can be an effective anticorruption strategy because women are less corruptible than 
men. While the concept of women inherently possessing a higher level of integrity has been 
challenged, studies have confirmed that there is a link between higher representation of women 
in government and lower levels of corruption (Dollar et al., 1999; Goetz, 2004; Sung, 2003). 
                                                            
13
 Table 5 (Appendix)  provides a detailed description of variables. 
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- General government consumption expenditure (thereafter G) – in % of GDP: it controls for 
government size. There is no consensus among authors on the theoretical relationship between 
government size and corruption (Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Bonaglia et al., 2001; Ali and Isse, 
2003). Moreover, in order to consider a possible endogeneity of government sector size, in some 
estimations we treat G as endogenous. 
- Net enrollment primary rate, in natural log (thereafter lnschool): it controls for human capital 
development. Empirical literature found contrasting evidence (Ali and Isse, 2003; Frechette, 
2001).14 
We follow the standard practice of counting a country as democratic according to its rate of Polity 
IV political freedom score. Polity IV provides data on democracy level and regime duration. The 
Polity IV index is a combined polity score ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly 
democratic), arrived at by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score. The democracy 
and autocracy indexes were originally constructed additively based on the following indicators: 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief 
executive, regulation of participation and competitiveness of participation. Scholars have reduced 
the index to a dichotomous measure of democracy and autocracy. Two different thresholds are 
frequently used for this purpose: the strictest measure defines countries which score 6 or higher on 
the combined index (Raknerud and Hegre, 1997) as democratic, whereas more lenient studies have 
taken score 3 as their threshold (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997). In this work, we follow the latter 
example and define as a democracy the countries whose score of Polity IV index is greater than +3 
in the year of election. 
 
4. Econometric specifications and results 
The empirical analysis is twofold: parametric and semi-parametric 
4.1 Parametric and semi-parametric analysis 
We start with a description of the parametric specification of the model. In order to test the 
hypothesis specified in section 2 we choose a cubic specification of the link between corruption and 
the proportionality degree of the electoral system as the more general nonlinear function. Therefore, 
the estimated equation is  

, = 
, +  +  +  + 
, + 
 +  + 
,					(1) 
of country I at time t; αi is a country-specific effect, µ t is a time-specific effect. Two lags of the 
dependent variable are introduced in the estimated equation because of the dynamic of corruption.15 
                                                            
14
 Table 6 ( Appendix) shows the correlation matrix of regressors. 
12 
 
Indeed, previous empirical analyses on corruption consider corruption as a dynamic phenomenon, 
where past levels of corruption affect present levels (Aidt, 2003). The linear, quadratic and cubic 
terms of GI catch the nonlinear specification of the model. The other regressors are those described 
in the previous section. 
Equation (1) is a dynamic panel data model which has been estimated using Arellano-Bover 
(1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM panel data techniques. The empirical analysis has been 
conducted on a panel of 75 countries16 over 27 years (from 1984 to 2010). 
The estimation results of the parametric analysis are in table 7 (Appendix). In order to control for 
heteroskedasticity, every estimated equation has robust standard errors. The second-to-last row of 
table 7 shows the Chi2 (and the p-value in parenthesis) of the Hansen test whose null hypothesis is 
that over-identification restrictions are valid; we do not reject the null and the model is correctly 
specified.17 The last row of table 7 displays the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for second-order 
autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals: in all the specifications there is no autocorrelation 
of residuals. 
An attempt to overcome the limits of parametric analysis of non-linear models is strongly 
recommended. A priori, we  ignore any hint useful for the choice of a specific functional form. A 
more general approach to the estimation of non-linear models is a non-parametric regression that 
does not require the specification of the underlying functional form (Li and Racine, 2007).  
The parametric analysis of corruption takes advantage of a rich econometric specification. A 
dynamic model for panel data accounts for the persistence of corruption, its lagged response to 
explanatory variables and residuals autocorrelation. Furthermore, some of the explanatory variables 
can be endogenous. Non-parametric methods for panel data are not as well developed as the 
parametric ones, and a dynamic model like (1) can hardly be estimated in a non-parametric setting. 
It is well known how a full non-parametric analysis faces the “curse of dimensionality” given by the 
rate of convergence of estimators being inversely related to the number of covariates. A widely 
accepted answer to this problem is provided by semi-parametric models where some components 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
15The estimation of equation (1) - without lags of corr - using fixed effect panel data techniques showed autocorrelation 
of residuals. In order to solve this problem, we introduced two lags of the dependent variable in the right-side of the 
equation (1).  
16
 Countries are: Albania; Argentina; Australia; Austria; Bahamas; Bangladesh; Belgium; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; 
Bulgaria; Canada; Chile; Costa Rica; Croatia; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; 
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; 
Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; South Korea; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Mongolia; Mozambique; 
Myanmar; Namibia; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Norway; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; 
Poland; Portugal; Romania; Senegal; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Suriname; Sweden; 
Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Trinidad & Tobago; Turkey; Ukraine; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; 
Zambia. 
17
 We also compute, but we do not show, the difference-in-Hansen test in order to test the joint validity of the full 
instrument set; we do not reject the null. 
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enter with a non-specified functional, while others are parametric. Here we apply the methods of 
Baltagi and Li (2002) to the panel data model:    
!
, = "
,# $ + %"
,& + 
 + '
, , ( = 1,…… ,*; , = 1, …… , -																												(2) 
where xi,t is a vector of explanatory variables, zi,t  is a variable with a nonlinear relation to the 
dependent variable, µi denotes fixed effects and νi,t  are i.i.d random errors. The function g(zi,t) is not 
specified. 
Model (2) can be transformed by taking the first difference to eliminate individual fixed effects. The 
new equation contains a non-linear component g(zi,t)-g(zi,t-1) that represents the main problem for 
model estimation. The solution advanced by Baltagi and Li (2002) is to approximate g(z) with the 
series pk(z), where pk(z) is the vector of the first k approximating functions. This implies that g(zi,t)-
g(zi,t-1) is approximated by pk(zi,t)-pk(zi,t-1). Spline functions are among the most used to approximate 
an unknown function. Splines are piece-wise polynomial functions defined over intervals of the 
support of z delimited by 1,...,k knots. The methodology advanced by Baltagi and Li (2002) 
proceeds with the estimation of the parameter vector γ  with the series method. This estimate is used 
to build an estimate of the error component νi,t  that becomes the dependent variable in the non-
parametric estimation of g(zi,t). 
We use this panel regression method to estimate a model of cross-country corruption where we 
distinguish a non-parametric component g(GIi,t) and a linear relationship between a set of control 
variables and the corruption index. In order to concentrate our analysis on the non-parametric 
relationship, we make some simplifying specification choices. The model is static, aiming at an 
estimation of the long-run relationship. Questions with omitted dynamics are tackled with the use of 
country time series made up of five-years averages and the introduction of time dummies among 
regressors. The use of time averages also has the advantage of reducing the attenuation bias which 
derives from possible measurement errors in the variables.  
 
4.2 Results 
Column (a) in table 7 shows the estimation of equation (1) only with lngdp and pop. The 
coefficients of GI, GI2 and GI3 are all highly significant, as well as the two lags of corr and lngdp. 
In order to graph the effect of the GI index on corruption, we use the following long-run equation:  
 = −0.190.23 + 0.0170.23  − 0.000380.23  + 0.1390.23 4567																	(3) 
In figure 1 below, on the horizontal axis we have constructed a scale of disproportionality index 
values starting with the minimum value (among countries) and increasing it by 1.1 to the maximum 
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value; then we calculate the Corruption index according to equation (3) using the estimated 
coefficients of GI, GI2, GI3and lngdp (the coefficient of pop is not significant).  
Figure 1: Parametric fit of the relationship between corruption and the Gallagher Index 
 
From the graph above, it emerges that the relationship between the proportionality degree of 
electoral system and corruption has a minimum and maximum value. The value of GI which 
maximises the Corruption index (that is, which minimises the level of corruption) is about 20, while 
the value of GI which minimises the Corruption index (that is, which maximises the level of 
corruption) is about 8. This shape of the proportionality degree-corruption relationship offers an 
interesting interpretation. Initially, moving from the extreme left of the horizontal axis towards the 
right, while the proportionality degree of the electoral system slightly reduces, the Corruption index 
decreases (corruption increases) to its minimum value. It is reasonable to believe that this happens 
because the electoral rule remains proportional, even though the proportionality degree of the 
electoral system changes. Indeed, the PR degree of proportionality may vary according to factors 
such as the precise formula used to allocate seats18, the number of seats in each constituency or in 
the elected body as a whole19, and the level of any minimum threshold for election. Therefore, 
reducing the proportionality degree of the electoral rule within PR systems (that is, without adding 
some majoritarian elements) implies the reduction of the monitoring power of opponents without 
introducing the voters’ monitoring on incumbent politicians - that means fertile ground for corrupt 
actions: in figure 1 Corruption index decreases (corruption increases). Instead, when the GI starts 
increasing (for example, it goes beyond 8, according to our estimations), it is also reasonable to 
believe that the corresponding electoral system has become mixed. This means that the monitoring 
power of opponents (ensured by PR elements) is reinforced by that of voters’ (ensured by plurality 
elements): the effects of responsiveness of PR and accountability of majoritarian representation, put 
                                                            
18Ranking PR formulas have been approached both theoretically (Gallagher 1992; Lijphart 1986; Loosemore and Hanby 
1971) and empirically (Gallagher 1991; Blondel 1969). The most widely accepted ranking is Lijphart’s (1986), which 
considers the Hare and Droop largest remainder (LR) methods to be the most proportional, followed by the Sainte-
Lagu¨e highest-average (HA) method, followed by Imperiali LR, d’Hondt HA, and Imperiali HA. A critical re-
examination of the ranking of electoral formulas was proposed by Benoit (2000).   
19
 Generally, the wider the district magnitude, the more proportional the PR is. 
GI 
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together, are stronger at fighting corruption. This can be clearly seen in figure 1 starting from the 
GI=8; the Corruption index begins to grow as the GI rises up to the value of about 20 which 
maximises the Corruption index. After reaching its maximum, the Corruption index decreases 
again. It is interesting to underline that in the increasing section of the Corruption index in figure 1 
(which corresponds to the interval of GI [8-20]), the small reduction in the proportionality degree of 
mixed rule implies that the marginal substitution between the monitoring power of opponents in 
favour of the monitoring power of voters is beneficial in fighting corruption. While considering 
mixed electoral rules with a proportionality degree always lower (GI>20), the same marginal 
substitution leads to a corruption increase: this happens because the monitoring power of opponents 
almost disappears. As figure 1 shows, we can find a value of the GI which maximises the 
Corruption index (meaning minimising the level of corruption). This suggests that the “best” 
proportionality degree that a mixed system should have must almost equally balance the voters’ and 
the opponents’ monitoring power in order to maintain their independence and re-enforce each other. 
This result remains robust with the introduction of all the control variables that we listed above, as 
shown in table 7.  
Where significant, Lngdp is positive as expected, meaning that a greater level of economic 
development is correlated to less perceived corruption. Pop, instead, is never significant. Starting 
from column (b) we introduce gov_stab: it is always significant (except  in specification (i)) and 
positive, as expected - the higher the quality of government, the lower the corruption. The same 
happens for dem, from specification (c): it is always positive and significant (except in (i)) - the 
greater the level of democracy of a country, the lower the level of corruption. Law_order controls 
for the rule of law: in specification (d) it is treated as exogenous and its sign is positive and 
significant - a stronger rule of law reduces the likelihood of corruption. In order to take into account 
the issue of causality of this variable, in specification (e) we treat it as endogenous - the result does 
not change. Columns (f) and (i) show that women and lnschool are not significant. Public 
consumption spending shows a positive and significant coefficient in (g) - the larger the relative 
size of public sector, the lower the likelihood of corruption; this coefficient becomes insignificant if 
G is treated as endogenous as in (h). 
The estimation of the parametric model (1) provided us with a peculiar non-linear relationship 
between the Gallagher disproportionality index and the Corruption index. We conducted a semi-
parametric in order to confirm this particular functional form. As in the parametric model, the semi-
parametric one considers the variable of interest GI entering the regression equation as exogenous. 
However, we depart from that econometric specification by including in the linear component of the 
model only those variables that can be considered exogenous, on the basis of the results of the 
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theoretical and applied literature. In particular, this is the case of democratic accountability (dem), 
government stability (gov_stab), proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (wom), 
and the population (pop). Table 8 (Appendix) presents the results of the estimation of five 
specifications of the model. All the specifications include time dummies to account for shifts in the 
relationships over the period 1984-2010. As Desbordes and Verardi (2012) have done, we use B-
splines both as base functions pk(GI) and to estimate g(GIi,t).20 
In the baseline estimates (a’), the linear regressors are time dummies. Other regressions see the 
addition of one variable at a time. Estimates confirm that democratic accountability and government 
stability are significant explanatory variables of corruption.  
Figure (2) shows the plot of the non-parametric estimate of g(GIi,t) for each of the five 
specifications of the parametric component of the model. In particular, each panel displays the plot 
of the relation between Corr and GI net of the fixed effects and the linear part of the regression 
equation.21 In each graph the shaded area displays confidence intervals at 95% level of confidence. 
The five plots of the estimate of the function g(GIi,t) show almost the same shape: a U followed by 
an inverted U. Hence, we find a substantial confirmation of the main result of the parametric 
analysis. As the graphs display, the results are confirmed not only by their shape, but also by their 
values. That is, the min and max of the Corruption index in the semi-parametric analysis fall 
approximately at a GI=8 and a GI=20 respectively, similar to the findings of the parametric 
analysis. This emphasises even more the robustness of the relationship that we found between the 
proportionality degree of electoral rules and corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
20
 Computations were made using the STATA command  xtsemipar by François Libois and Vincenzo Verardi (2013). 
21
 The variable on the vertical axis is re-centered around its mean value. 
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Figure 2: Non-parametric fit of the relationship between corruption and the Gallagher Index. Partial residuals centred 
around the mean. 
 
 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This work offers a parametric and semi-parametric analysis of the relationship between the 
proportionality degree of an electoral system and corruption. The use of the Gallagher dis-
proportionality index as a measure of the proportionality degree of an electoral rule has allowed us 
to properly consider mixed electoral systems alongside the two traditional ones, PR and plurality. 
Given that mixed rules are becoming the preferred choice of more and more governors, it seems 
very important and interesting to consider the effect that they have on corruption and, thus filling 
18 
 
the gap empirical literature has in this field. Results confirm our theoretical framework and show 
that the relationship between the proportionality degree and corruption is not linear. Graphically, 
this relationship appears as a sine curve, with the Corruption index reaching its minimum at low 
values of GI, and its maximum at high values of GI. The policy implications of this result are 
newsworthy. Even though PR allow their proportionality degree to be modified through the 
variation of the electoral formula or the introduction of some thresholds, the reduction of the 
proportionality degree within the same PR is not beneficial in fighting corruption. Indeed, this kind 
of system  weakens the monitoring power of opponents (because the representativeness reduces) 
without the introduction of the voters’ monitoring. On the contrary, the contamination of the PR 
with plurality elements (therefore, the switch to mixed rules), allows both monitors to exercise their 
power to induce politicians to avoid corrupt behaviour. Increasing plurality elements into mixed 
systems is beneficial only up to certain proportionality degrees; after this the corresponding level of 
corruption begins to grow. For governors who want to adopt mixed electoral systems, their choice 
of proportionality degree becomes, therefore, fundamental. Further studies are needed in helping 
governors to make this choice.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Statistics 
Variable Mean 
 
Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
corr 3.39 overall 1.42 0 6 N =  2160 
  between 1.19 n =  85 
  within 0.77 T =  25 
GI 7.64 overall 6.54 0.26 33.25 N =  1975 
  between 5.46 n =  85 
  within 3.67 T =  23 
lngdp 8.26 overall 1.46 4.9 10.9 N =  2566 
  
 
between 1.44 
  
n =  83 
  
 
within 0.22 
  
T =  31 
pop 3.97e+07 overall 1.14e+08 210600 1.24e+09 N =  2688 
  
 
between 1.13e+08 
  
n =  84 
  
 
within 1.89e+07 
  
T =  32 
gov_stab 7.63 overall 2.01 1 11.5 N =  2153 
  
 
between 0.89 
  
n =  85 
  
 
within 1.81 
  
T =  25 
dem 4.92 overall 1.79 0 11.5 N =  2153 
  
 
between 1.43 
  
n =  85 
  
 
within 1.05 
  
T =  25 
law_order 3.93 overall 1.53 0 6 N = 2153 
  
 
between 1.32 
  
n =  85 
  
 
within 0.74 
  
T =  25 
wom 14.4 overall 10.1 0 47.3 N =  2347 
  
 
between 7.5 
  
n =  84 
  
 
within 6.9 
  
T =  28 
G 0.18 overall 0.08 0.03 1.55 N = 2502 
  
 
between 0.06 
  
n =  81 
  
 
within 0.05 
  
T =  31 
lnschool 4.48 overall 0.2 2.9 4.6 N =  1494 
  
 
between 0.18 
  
n =  81 
  
 
within 0.08 
  
T =  18 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of countries according to their electoral system, 1980-2011  
PR Mixed Plurality 
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, 
Denmark, Ecuador El Salvator (since 1998 ), 
Finland, Guinea-Bissau (Since 2007), Guyana, 
Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy (since 
1980 to 1993), Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova 
(since 1994), Mongolia 2009, Mozambique 
(since 1995), Namibia (since 1989), 
Netherlands, Nicaragua (since 1987), Norway, 
Paraguay,  Peru (since 1981), Poland (since 
1990 to 2006), Portugal, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Moldova (since 1994), Mongolia 2009, 
Mozambique (since 1995), Namibia (since 
1989 ), Netherlands, Nicaragua (since 1987), 
Norway, Paraguay, Peru (since 1981), Poland 
(since 1990 to 2006), Portugal, Romania (since 
1991 to 2006), Slovakia (since 1993), Slovenia 
(since 1992), South Africa, Sri Lanka,  
Suriname (since 1988), Sweden, Turkey (since 
1984), Ukraine (since 2007), Uruguay (since 
1985). 
Albania (since 1992), Australia, Bolivia 
(since 1983), Brazil, Croatia (since 
1993), Czech Rep. (since 1991), Dom. 
Rep., El Salvador (since 1983 to 1997), 
Germany,  Greece, Guatemala (since 
1986), Honduras (since 1982), Hungary 
(since 1991), India, Italy (since 1994), 
Japan, Lithuania (since 1993), 
Mozambique (in 1994), New Zealand 
(since 1993), Philippines (since 1999), 
Poland (since 2007), Romania (since 
2007),  Senegal, South Korea, Spain, 
Suriname (1980), Switzerland, Taiwan 
(since 1992), Ukraine (since 1998 to 
2003) 
 
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Botswana,  
Canada, Chile (since 1990), France, 
Jamaica, Mongolia (since 1993 to 
2008), New Zealand (since 1980 to 
1992),   P. N. Guinea, Philippines 
(since 1988 to 1997), Thailand, 
Trinidad-Tobago, Ukraine (since 1994 
to 1997), UK, USA, Zambia (since 
1992) 
 
Source: Database of Political Institutions 2012. Mixed systems are those in which both PR and plurality elements 
coexist. Our Elaboration. 
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Table 3: list of countries, in decades, from their first democratic election 
1980-2001 1990-2011 2000-2011 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, 
Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guyana, 
Honduras, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, 
Malaysia, Malta, Namibia, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States, Uruguay 
Bangladesh, Czech Republic, Guatemala, 
Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Lituania, Moldova, Mongolia, Myanmar, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South-Africa, 
Ukraine, Zambia  
Albania, Croatia 
 
 
Table 4: GI statistics according to electoral systems, 1980-2011 
PR MIXED PLURALITY 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
4.6 4.4 0.26 29.4 7.8 4.9 0.91 30.2 14.4 7.5 1.3 33.25 
 
 
Table 5: Variables description 
Corr Corruption Index. Source: ICRG, 1984-2010. 
GI Gallagher Disproportionality index. Source: Gallagher Electoral Disproportionality Data, 1945-
2011http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf. 
lngdp Natural logarithm of gross domestic product at constant price 2000 US. Source: World Bank, 1980-2011. 
pop Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. Source: 
World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects, 
1980-2011. 
gov_stab Government stability. It is an assessment both of the government’s ability to carry out its declared 
program(s), and its ability to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents 
(Government Unity, Legislative Strength, Popular Support), each with a maximum score of four points and 
a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very 
High Risk. This index ranges in the interval (0, 12). Source: ICRG, 1984-2010. 
dem Democratic accountability. Measure of how responsive a government is to its people, meaning the more 
responsive it is, the more likely it is that the government will fall peacefully, in a democratic society, but 
possibly violently in a non-democratic one.  
The points in this component are awarded on the basis of the type of governance the country in question 
has. This index ranges in the interval (0, 6). Source: ICRG, 1984-2010. 
law_order Law and Order is composed of two sub-components which range from zero to three points. 
. The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the 
Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high 
rating – 3 – in terms of its judicial system, but a low rating – 1 – if it suffers from a very high crime rate or 
if the law is routinely ignored without effective sanction (for example, widespread illegal strikes). This 
index ranges in the interval (0, 6). Source: ICRG, 1984-2010. 
wom Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%). The data refer to Unicameral assembly or 
lower chamber of bicameral assembly. These data are comparable with United Nations Women's Indicators 
and Statistics Database – Wistat published by World Bank. Source: PARLIA database, 1980-2011. 
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif-arc.htm, 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx 
G General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP). Source: Penn World Table, 1980- 2011. 
lnschool Natural log of the net enrolment primary rate. It is the ratio between the number of children enrolled in 
primary schools and the total number of children of official primary school age. Source: World 
Development Indicators http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.NENR, 1980-2011. 
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Table 6: Correlations 
 GI lngdp pop gov_stab dem law_order wom G lnschool 
GI 1         
lngdp -0.22         
pop -0.009 -0.12 1       
gov_stab 0.02 0.11 -0.009 1      
dem -0.24 0.39 0.04 0.20 1     
law_order -0.15 0.66 -0.06 0.17 0.46 1    
wom -0.35 0.31 -0.14 0.16 0.26 0.30 1   
G 0.08 -0.11 -0.07 -0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.03 1  
lnschool -0.13 0.53 -0.02 -0.06 0.34 0.27 0.12 0.09 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Estimations 
  (a)  (b) (c)  (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) 
corr(-1)
 
1.02*** 
(17) 
1.00*** 
(15) 
0.9*** 
(13) 
0.9*** 
(13) 
0.9*** 
(18) 
1.0*** 
(15) 
0.9*** 
(12) 
0.9*** 
(13) 
0.9*** 
(12) 
corr(-2) -0.25*** 
(-6) 
-0.23*** 
(-5) 
-0.23*** 
(-5) 
-0.24*** 
(-6) 
-0.22*** 
(-6) 
-0.24*** 
(-6) 
-0.22*** 
(-5) 
-0.22*** 
(-5) 
-0.22*** 
(-5) 
GI -0.19*** 
(-2.3) 
-0.21*** 
(-2.4) 
-0.22*** 
(-2.5) 
-0.21*** 
(-2.5) 
-0.09** 
(-2.06) 
-0.13** 
(-2.2) 
-0.30*** 
(-2.45) 
-0.30*** 
(-2.6) 
-0.2** 
(-2.05) 
GI2 0.017** 
(2.2) 
0.018** 
(2.3) 
0.02** 
(2.4) 
0.018** 
(2.3) 
0.007* 
(1.8) 
0.01** 
(2) 
0.02** 
(2.3) 
0.02** 
(2.5) 
0.01** 
(1.97) 
GI3 -0.0003** 
(-2.1) 
-0.0004** 
(-2.2) 
-0.0004** 
(-2.2) 
-0.0004** 
(-2.2) 
-0.0001* 
(-1.7) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.8) 
-0.0006** 
(-2.13) 
-0.0006** 
(-2.3) 
-0.0004* 
(-1.8) 
lngdp 0.13*** 
(3.2) 
0.13*** 
(3.1) 
0.125*** 
(2.9) 
0.05 
(1.07) 
0.02 
(0.7) 
0.09** 
(2.3) 
0.14*** 
(3) 
0.15*** 
(2.6) 
0.02 
(0.35) 
pop 1.79e-10 
(1.2) 
1.90e-10 
(1.4) 
1.72e-10 
(1.3) 
7.39e-11 
(0.6) 
4.76e-11 
(0.5) 
6.47e-11 
(0.5) 
2.32e-10 
(1.6) 
2.55e-10 
(1.3) 
4.09e-11 
(0.3) 
gov_stab  0.04** 
(2.3) 
0.03*** 
(1.9) 
0.02** 
(1.9) 
0.03** 
(2.37) 
0.04*** 
(3.3) 
0.05*** 
(2.9) 
0.05** 
(2.44) 
-0.002 
(-0.08) 
dem   0.05** 
(2.1) 
0.03* 
(1.85) 
0.03* 
(1.8) 
0.04** 
(1.98) 
0.05** 
(2.3) 
0.05** 
(2.2) 
0.03 
(1.35) 
law_order    0.1** 
(2.3) 
0.1** 
(2.08) 
   0.14** 
(2.1) 
wom      -0.002 
(-0.7) 
   
G       0.92** 
(2.17) 
1.48 
(0.5) 
 
lnschool         -0.1 
(-0.2) 
N. obs. 1374 1342 1342 1340 1404 1299 1294 1294 945 
Chi2 (p-value) 
Hansen test 
35 
(0.9) 
33 
(0.9) 
34 
(0.9) 
34 
(0.9) 
45 
(0.9) 
33 
(0.9) 
32 
(0.9) 
32 
(0.9) 
41 
(0.98 
p-value 2nd 
order 
autocorrelation 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.13 0.12 0.6 
Notes. All regressions contain calendar year dummies (results not reported); the time span is 1984-2010. The dependent variable is 
corr. Standardised normal z-test values are in parentheses; robust standard errors. In column (e) and (h) law_order and G respectively 
are treated as endogenous. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level). 
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Table 8: Semi-parametric Fixed Effects Estimation 
 (a’) (b’) (c’) (d’) (e’) 
dem  0.128*** 
(3.62) 
0.101*** 
(2.67) 
0.113*** 
(2.82) 
0.113*** 
(2.80) 
gov_stab   0.060* 
(1.92) 
0.065** 
(1.97) 
0.064* 
(1.89) 
wom    0.022 
(0.22) 
0.019 
(0.19) 
pop     0.188 
(0.24) 
Times dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.328 0.359 0.368 0.378 0.378 
N. obs. 272 270 270 260 260 
Notes. The dependent variable is corr. All regressions contain a non-parametric function of the Gallagher Disproportionality Index 
and time dummies for each five-year period (results not reported); the time span is 1984-2010. Standardised normal z-test values are 
in parentheses; robust standard errors. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level). 
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